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Abstract
In this paper we propose a new rule to allocate risk capital to portfolios or divisions
within a ﬁrm. Speciﬁcally, we determine the capital allocation that minimizes the
excesses of sets of portfolios in lexicographical sense. The excess of a set of portfolios
is deﬁned as the expected loss of that set of portfolios in excess of the amount of risk
capital allocated to them. The underlying idea is that large excesses are undesirable,
and therefore the goal is to determine the allocation for which the largest excess is
as small as possible. We show that this allocation rule yields a unique allocation,
and that it satisﬁes some desirable properties. We also show that the allocation can
be determined by solving a series of linear programming problems.
Keywords: risk capital, capital allocation, excesses, lexicographic minimum.
JEL-codes: G10, C61, C71.
1 Introduction
Regulators require that in order to be able to hold a risky position, ﬁnancial institutions
withhold a level of capital, referred to as risk capital. The risk capital needs to be added
to the risky position and invested safely in order to act as a buﬀer and reduce the adverse
eﬀects of unfavorable events on the solvency of the ﬁrm. The focus in this paper is on the
allocation of the total amount of risk capital to diﬀerent subportfolios, divisions, or lines
of business. As argued by, e.g., Tasche (1999), withholding risk capital is costly, and
therefore allocating risk capital to individual investments is important for performance
evaluation as well as for pricing decisions. The allocation problem is nontrivial because
the amount of risk capital allocated to a portfolio consisting of multiple subportfolios is
typically less than the sum of the amounts of risk capital that would need to be withheld
for each subportfolio separately. The underlying intuition is that because the risks of
diﬀerent subportfolios are typically not perfectly correlated, some hedge potential may
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1arise from combining diﬀerent subportfolios. The issue then is what is a “fair” division
of these diversiﬁcation gains over the subportfolios.
The allocation problem described above has received considerable attention in the lit-
erature. Tasche (1999) considers allocation of risk capital to ﬁnancial instruments in a
portfolio, and argues that the only “appropriate” way to allocate risk capital for per-
formance measurement purposes is to determine the marginal risk contribution of each
investment. The marginal risk contribution is deﬁned as the derivative of the aggre-
gate risk capital with respect to the weight of the ﬁnancial instrument in the portfolio.
Denault (2001) instead proposes a game-theoretic approach to determine risk capital
allocations for companies with multiple business divisions. He focuses on risk capital
allocations that are ”fair” in the sense that no set of divisions is allocated more risk
capital than the amount of risk capital that they would need to withhold if they were
on their own. He shows that when business divisions are inﬁnitely divisible, the only
allocation that satisﬁes this fairness condition is the marginal risk contribution deﬁned
above. In game-theoretic terms, this allocation is referred to as the Aumann-Shapley
value. For the special case where the risk measure is Expected Shortfall, the correspond-
ing allocation rule is also referred to as Conditional Tail Expectation (CTE) rule (see,
e.g., Overbeck 2000, Panjer 2002, and Dhaene et al. 2008, 2009).
The literature on risk capital allocation has then evolved in several directions. First,
there is some literature that considers the risk capital allocation that results from using
the Aumann-Shapley value when a speciﬁc risk measure is used (Tsanakas and Bar-
nett 2003, and Tsanakas 2009), or when the portfolio losses have a speciﬁc probability
distribution (Panjer 2001, and Landsman and Valdez 2003). Second, there is some liter-
ature that focuses on generalizations or extensions of the Aumann-Shapley value (e.g.,
Fisher 2003, Tsanakas 2004, Powers 2007, and Furman and Zitikis 2008), or on capital
allocations that result when alternative game-theoretic concepts are used (Cs` oka 2009).
Third, Myers and Read Jr. (2001), Sherris (2006), and Kim and Hardy (2009) consider
alternative capital allocation rules based on solvency ratios or expected return. Finally,
there is a stream of literature in which the capital allocation is determined as the solution
of an optimization problem (Dhaene, Goovaerts, and Kaas 2003, Laeven and Goovaerts
2004, Goovaerts, Van den Borre, and Laeven 2005, and Dhaene, Tsanakas, Valdez, and
Vanduﬀel 2009). Speciﬁcally, they consider capital allocations such that the (weighted)
sum of a measure for the deviation of the business unit’s losses from its allocated risk
capital is minimized. Dhaene, Tsanakas, Valdez, and Vanduﬀel (2009) show that by
choosing speciﬁc deviation measures and/or speciﬁc weights, one can reproduce several
of the allocation techniques proposed in the literature, including, e.g., the CTE rule.
In this paper we propose an alternative approach to allocate risk capital that falls into
the latter stream of literature. Our approach is inspired by the fact that allocating risk
capital on the basis of the Aumann-Shapley value can lead to undesirable allocations in
the sense that the expected excess loss, i.e., the loss of the subportfolio in excess of the
amount of risk capital allocated to it, can diﬀer substantially across subportfolios. Large
diﬀerences in expected excess losses could be perceived as unfair by managers who are
evaluated based on the risk capital allocated to their portfolios. Therefore, we propose
2an alternative allocation rule in which the goal is to determine the capital allocation
that minimizes the excesses of all subportfolios in lexicographical sense. This implies
that, from a set of feasible allocations, one ﬁrst selects those allocations for which the
highest excess is minimized. Within the set of allocations for which the highest excess is
minimized, one then determines those allocations for which the second highest excess is
minimized, and so on. This approach diﬀers from the existing optimization approaches
in two ways. First, whereas the existing literature focuses on minimizing the aggregate
(weighted) excess over all portfolios, we consider each excess separately. Second, we
do not only take into account the excesses of the individual portfolios, but also of all
possible subsets of portfolios.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we formally deﬁne risk capital allocation
problems, and show that the Aumann-Shapley value can lead to allocations in which the
excess losses are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent across portfolios. We then deﬁne the alternative
risk capital allocation rule that we propose, which we will refer to as the Excess Based
Allocation (eba). In section 3 we deﬁne desirable properties of a risk capital allocation
rule, and show that eba satisﬁes these properties. In section 4 we show how eba can
be determined by solving a sequence of linear programming problems. We conclude in
section 5.
2 Model
In this section, we ﬁrst deﬁne risk capital allocation problems and risk capital allocation
rules. Next, we discuss an allocation rule that has received considerable attention in the
literature. We then propose an alternative risk capital allocation rule.
2.1 Risk Capital Allocation Problems
Our focus in this paper is on the allocation of risk capital to subportfolios. We consider a
portfolio consisting of n subportfolios, indexed by i = 1,    ,n. Subportfolio i generates
a random loss Xi at a given future date, and so the aggregate loss is given by
 n
i=1 Xi.
Regulators require that, in order to be able to hold this risky position, an amount of
risk capital should be withheld and invested safely. The total required amount of risk
capital is determined by means of a risk measure, and the issue is how to allocate this
total amount to the n subportfolios.
Throughout this paper we will use this following notation:
• N = {1,    ,n} denotes the set of subportfolios;
• Ω = {ω1,    ,ωm} denotes the ﬁnite set of states of the world;
• π(ω) > 0 denotes the probability that state ω ∈ Ω occurs;1
1We assume that for each state ω ∈ Ω, it holds that π(ω) > 0, i.e., the probability that the state
occurs is strictly positive. Because we consider a ﬁnite state space, this is without loss of generality;
states that occur with zero probability can be omitted from the state space.
3• Xi(ω) denotes the loss from subportfolio i in state ω ∈ Ω;
• X = {X1,    ,Xn} denotes the losses of the n subportfolios;
• V denotes the set of random variables on Ω;
• 1∈ V denotes the random variable given by: 1(ω) = 1 for all ω ∈ Ω.
The amount of risk capital that needs to be withheld in order to be able to hold a risky
position Y ∈ V is determined by means of a risk measure ρ : V → R. Following Artzner,
Delbaen, Eber, and Heath (1999), we consider the case where risk capital is determined
by means of a coherent risk measure. A risk measure ρ : V → R is coherent if and only
if it satisﬁes the following four properties:2
(i) Subadditivity: for all Y1,Y2 ∈ V
ρ(Y1 + Y2) ≤ ρ(Y1) + ρ(Y2).
(ii) Monotonicity: for all Y1,Y2 ∈ V such that Y1(ω) ≥ Y2(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω
ρ(Y1) ≥ ρ(Y2).
(iii) Positive Homogeneity: for all Y ∈ V and c ≥ 0
ρ(c   Y ) = c   ρ(Y ).
(iv) Translation Invariance: for all Y ∈ V and c ∈ R
ρ(Y + c   1) = ρ(Y ) + c.
While all the results presented in this paper hold true for any coherent risk measure, in
our numerical examples we will use Expected Shortfall as risk measure. In the literature,
Expected Shortfall has been deﬁned in diﬀerent ways and not all deﬁnitions result in a
coherent risk measure. This is the case in particular if the distribution of the loss has
point masses. To ensure coherence, we use the deﬁnition which is due to Acerbi and
Tasche (2002). First, let q1−α(Y ) denote the upper 100   (1 − α)%-quantile of Y ∈ V,
i.e.,
q1−α(Y ) = inf{y ∈ R|P (Y ≤ y) > 1 − α}.
2Note that whereas Artzner et al. (1999) considers random gains, X ∈ V in our case is deﬁned as a
loss. This aﬀects the Monotonicity and the Translation Invariance property.
4Then, Expected Shortfall is deﬁned as3
ρES
α (Y ) =
E
 
Y   1Y ≥q1−α(Y )
 
− q1−α(Y )   [P (Y ≥ q1−α(Y )) − α]
α
. (1)
For any given coherent risk measure ρ, the amount of risk capital that needs to be















i.e., due to diversiﬁcation eﬀects, the amount of risk capital for the aggregate portfolio is
weakly less than the sum of the amounts of risk capital that would need to be withheld
for every individual subportfolio. This implies that allocating the aggregate amount to
the subportfolios is non-trivial; one cannot simply allocate to each subportfolio the risk
capital that it would need to hold on its own. There are gains from diversiﬁcation, and
the issue is how to divide these gains over the subportfolios. We refer to this problem
as a risk capital allocation problem. In the sequel we will refer to a subportfolio as
a portfolio. Moreover, throughout the paper we assume that Ω and N are ﬁxed, and
denote a risk capital allocation problem as a tuple (X,π,ρ). We denote the set of all
risk capital allocation problems by R.
The following deﬁnition formally deﬁnes risk capital allocations and risk capital
allocation rules.
Deﬁnition 2.1
(i) For any risk capital allocation problem R = (X,π,ρ) ∈ R, a risk capital allocation
for R is a vector a ∈ RN such that
 
i∈N ai = ρ(
 
i∈N Xi).
(ii) For a subclass R′ ⊆ R of risk capital allocation problems, a risk capital allocation
rule on R′ is a function A : R′ → RN such that A(R) is a risk capital allocation
for R for all R ∈ R′.
Throughout the paper, we will use the following shorthand notation: for any given








ai for the amount allocated to the portfolios in S.
In the following section we ﬁrst discuss a risk capital allocation rule that has received
considerable attention in the literature, and discuss some of its drawbacks.
3In case the losses have a continuous distribution, (1) simpliﬁes to ρ
ES
α (Y ) = E [Y |Y ≥ q1−α(Y )].
However, if Y is not continuous, this does not yield a coherent risk measure; more speciﬁcally, Subaddi-
tivity is violated.
52.2 Marginal risk contribution and the Aumann-Shapley value
An approach that has received considerable attention in the literature is referred to as the
marginal risk contribution rule. Denault (2001) argues that in order for an allocation to
be “fair”, it should be such that the amount of risk capital allocated to a set of portfolios
is weakly lower than the amount of risk capital that they would have to withhold if they
were on their own. This property is referred to as the no undercut property.
In game-theoretic terms, the no-undercut property means that the allocation should
be in the core of the corresponding game, which is given by
Core(R) = {a ∈ RN|aS ≤ ρ(XS)for allS ⊆ N,aN = ρ(XN)}.
The core of the game is the set of all risk capital allocations such that each set of
portfolios S ⊆ N, the amount allocated to those portfolios, aS, is weakly lower than the
risk capital they would have incurred on their own, ρ(XS). Denault (2001) shows that
the core of a capital allocation game is non-empty. In order to identify a speciﬁc core
element, he suggests to require, in addition, that the no undercut property holds also for
fractional portfolios. Thus, for any combination of fractions of portfolios s ∈ [0,1]N, the
amount allocated to
 
i∈N siXi should be weakly lower than the risk capital that that
portfolio would need to withhold if it was separated from the ﬁrm. In game-theoretic





   







siXi)for alls ∈ [0,1]N,aN = ρ(XN)
 
.
Denault (2001) shows that if the function r : [0,1]N → R deﬁned as




is partially diﬀerentiable at s = (1,1,    ,1), then the fuzzy core consists of one element,





(1,1,    ,1), for all i ∈ N. (2)
This allocation is referred to as the marginal risk contribution; the amount of risk
capital allocated to a given portfolio is equal to that portfolio’s marginal contribution
to the aggregate risk capital ρ(
 
i∈N Xi). In game-theoretic terms, the allocation is
referred to as the Aumann-Shapley value.4 A special case that has received considerable
attention in the literature (see, e.g., Tasche 1999, Overbeck 2000, Panjer 2002, Venter






∂si(γ,γ,··· ,γ)dγ for all i. Due to the
positive homogeneity of the risk measure ρ, this expression in our case simpliﬁes to (2).
62004, Kalkbrener 2005, and Dhaene et al. 2008) is the case where the risk measure is
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P(XN=q1−α(XN)) , if P (XN = q1−α(XN)) > 0
= 0, if P (XN = q1−α(XN)) = 0.
(4)
This rule is also referred to as CTE (Conditional Tail Expectation) allocation. In case
the aggregate loss XN has a continuous distribution, it holds that β = 0, and (3)
simpliﬁes to
AAS
i (R) = E (Xi|XN > q1−α(XN)). (5)
Using entirely diﬀerent arguments, both Denault (2001) and Tasche (1999) identify the
marginal risk contribution rule as the unique rule that satisﬁes some desirable properties.
Denault shows that it is the only allocation that satisﬁes the no undercut property if one
also allows fractional portfolios. Tasche (1999) argues that it is the only allocation rule
that is “suitable” for performance measurement because it is the only allocation that
ensures that (marginally) increasing the share of a portfolio improves the overall return
of the ﬁrm if the risk-adjusted return of that portfolio with respect to the amount of
risk capital allocated to it is higher than that of the whole ﬁrm. It has been argued in
the literature, however, that one of the drawbacks of the Aumann-Shapley value as an
allocation rule is that it requires diﬀerentiability of r( ) (e.g., Koster 1999, and Fischer
2003). In the remainder of this section we show that even when the diﬀerentiability
condition is satisﬁed, allocating risk capital on the basis of the Aumann-Shapley value
may lead to undesirable allocations. As can be seen from (3), the Aumann-Shapley
value in case Expected Shortfall is used as risk measure (i.e., the CTE rule) results from
taking the expectation of the loss of portfolio i, conditional on those states of the world
in which the aggregate loss weakly exceeds its (1−α) 100%-quantile. Thus, the amount
of risk capital allocated to a portfolio depends only on the distribution of its loss in
those particular states of the world. The following example shows that this can lead to
allocations for which it is questionable whether they would be perceived as fair.
With slight abuse of notation, we denote π = (π(ω1),    ,π(ωm))⊤ ∈ Rm for the vector
that contains the probabilities of the diﬀerent states. Likewise, for all portfolios i =
1,    ,n, we denote Xi = (Xi(ω1),    ,Xi(ωm))⊤ ∈ Rm for the vector that contains the
realizations of Xi in each state of the world.















































We use Expected Shortfall at the 15%-level as a risk measure, i.e., ρ(Y ) = ρES
0.15(Y ).
Now ﬁrst consider the case where γ ≤ 30. Then, we ﬁnd for XN that
q1−α(XN) = inf{x ∈ R|P (XN ≤ x) > 0.85} = 60.
This implies that the Expected Shortfall of the aggregate risk is given by
ρ(XN) = α−1(E[XN   1XN≥q1−α(XN)] − q1−α(XN)   [P (XN ≥ q1−α(XN)) − α])
= 0.15−1 (E (XN   1XN≥60) − 60   [P (XN ≥ 60) − 0.15])
= 0.15−1(60  
1
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The aggregate risk capital in case γ ≥ 30 can be determined in a similar way. This
yields
ρ(XN) = 64, if γ ≤ 30,
= 54 +
γ
3, if 30 < γ ≤ 36,
= 30 + γ, if γ ≥ 36.
Moreover, it can be veriﬁed that ρ(s1X1 + s2X2) is diﬀerentiable at s = (1,1) if and
only if γ / ∈ {30,36}, i.e., the Aumann-Shapley value does not exist for γ ∈ {30,36}. For
γ / ∈ {30,36}, it follows from (4) that
β = 0.5, if γ < 30,
= 0.5, if 30 < γ < 36,
= 0.15
0.4 , if γ > 36.
Combined with (3), this yields
AAS(R) = (40,24), if γ < 30,
= (50,4 +
γ
3), if 30 < γ < 36,
= (30,γ), if γ > 36.
We see that:
• At γ = 30 or γ = 36, a marginal change in the loss distribution of portfolio 2
due to a marginal change in γ induces a signiﬁcant change in the allocation. For
example, a marginal increase in the loss of portfolio 2 due to a marginal increase
in γ from just below 30 to just above 30, implies that the amount of risk capital
allocated to portfolio 2 jumps down by 41.7%;
8• for any γ < 36, the amount of risk capital allocated to portfolio 2 is strictly lower
than the amount allocated to portfolio 1, even though for any γ ≥ −15, portfolio
2 is strictly more risky than portfolio 1 in the sense that P(X2 > x) ≥ P(X1 > x)
for all x ∈ R, with a strict inequality for all x ∈ (0,6).
One could question whether an allocation rule that yields the above results could be
perceived as fair by managers whose performance evaluation is based on the amount of
risk capital allocated to them. As can be seen from (3), the risk capital allocated to the
portfolios is determined exclusively by those states in which the aggregate loss is weakly
higher than its 85% quantile. The allocation does not depend on the possible losses in
the other states of the world. In the above example, this implies that the more risky
portfolio gets allocated less risk capital.
Next, as argued also by Denault (2001), another drawback of allocating risk capital
based on the Aumann-Shapley value is that it can imply that certain portfolios are
allocated a negative risk capital. This is illustrated in the next example.
Example 2.3 Consider the risk capital allocation problem R, which is deﬁned by Ω =

































and ρ(Y ) = ρES
0.10(Y ). It is easily veriﬁed that the aggregate risk capital is given by
ρ(XN) = 50, and that β =0.3. Therefore, it follows from (3) that the Aumann-Shapley
value is given by
AAS(R) = (−5,−5,60).
Portfolios 1 and 2 both are allocated negative risk capital. This occurs because the
Aumann-Shapley value is based only on the state where portfolio 3 has the highest losses,
which in this case is state ω3. In that state, however, portfolios 1 and 2 make gains.
The above example shows that when potential losses are negatively correlated and diﬀer
in magnitude, the risk capital is determined exclusively by those states of the world
where the portfolios for which the losses are largest in magnitude incur losses, leading
to negative risk capital for those portfolios that incur gains in those states. Consider for
example an insurance company that holds a portfolio of life annuities and a portfolio
of death beneﬁt insurance policies. Because the present value of the liabilities of life
annuities increases when death rates decrease, and the opposite holds for the present
value of the liabilities of death beneﬁt insurance, the two types of liabilities are typically
negatively correlated (see, e.g., Cox and Lin, 2007; Wang et al., 2010; and Tsai et al.,
2010). The above example suggests that using the CTE rule to allocate risk capital
in this case could result in negative risk capital allocated to one of the two portfolios.
9Clearly, negative risk capital is not conceptually ”wrong”; it is an indication that the
corresponding portfolio provides some hedge potential. However, as argued by Denault
(2001), if the capital allocation is to be used in a ratio of return over allocated risk
capital-type performance measure, a slightly negative risk capital would yield a largely
negative risk-adjusted performance measure.
2.3 Excess Based Allocation
The examples in the previous section illustrate some drawbacks of allocating risk capital
based on the Aumann-Shapley value. Because part of the probability distribution of the
individual losses is ignored, it can lead to allocations in which the higher risk portfolio
receives the lowest risk capital. This in turn implies that the expected losses of portfolios
in excess of the amount of risk capital allocated to them can diﬀer substantially across
portfolios. When capital allocation is used to assess the performance of the diﬀerent
portfolios, this is clearly undesirable. We therefore introduce an alternative allocation
rule, which we refer to as Excess Based Allocation (eba). The goal is to ﬁnd capital
allocations in which the excess risks are minimized in lexicographical sense.
This section is organized as follows. We ﬁrst introduce a set of feasible risk capital
allocations. Next, we deﬁne the excess of a set of portfolios with respect to a feasible
allocation as the expectation of the loss of that set of portfolios in excess of the risk
capital allocated to them. We then formally deﬁne the allocation rule. We conclude this
section by showing that for each risk capital allocation problem R ∈ R, the allocation
rule yields a unique capital allocation, which we refer to as EBA(R).
The allocation rule that we propose determines the allocation that lexicographically
minimizes the portfolios’ excesses among a set of allocations that satisﬁes two basic
properties. First, no portfolio is allocated more risk capital than the amount of risk
capital that it would need to withhold if it were on its own. Second, a portfolio is not
allocated less than the minimum loss it can incur. We refer to allocations that satisfy
these properties as feasible allocations. Formally, we have the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 2.4
(i) The set of all feasible risk capital allocations for a risk capital allocation problem





   
 aN = ρ(XN), min
ω∈Ω
Xi(ω) ≤ ai ≤ ρ(Xi) forall i ∈ N
 
. (6)
(ii) A risk capital allocation rule A on R′ ⊆ R for which it holds that A(R) ∈ F(R)
for all R ∈ R′ is referred to as a feasible risk capital allocation rule on R′.
The following example illustrates how the set F(R) is determined for a given capital
allocation problem R ∈ R.
10Example 2.5 Consider again Example 2.2 with γ = −15, and recall that ρ(X1+X2) =
64. Moreover, it can be veriﬁed that ρ(X1) = 50 and ρ(X2) = 50. So, the set of feasible
allocations is given by
F(R) =
 
a ∈ R2 |a1 + a2 = 64,−15 ≤ a1 ≤ 50,−15 ≤ a2 ≤ 50
 
.
Observe that portfolios 1 and 2 face the same constraints in F(R). Now, recall from
Example 2.2 that the Aumann-Shapley value in this case equals
AAS(R) = (40,24).
It is seen immediately that AAS(R) is an element of F(R).
In the case considered in Example 2.5, we ﬁnd that the Aumann-Shapley value is an
element of the feasible set F(R). Recall that the Aumann-Shapley value is the unique
allocation that satisﬁes the no undercut property for fractional portfolios. This raises
the question whether more generally allocations that satisfy the no undercut property
(i.e., all (fuzzy) core elements) are in the feasible set. The following theorem shows that
coherence of the risk measure ensures that this is indeed the case.
Theorem 2.6 For all risk capital allocation problems R ∈ R, the set of feasible capital
allocations F(R) is non-empty and compact. Moreover,
FCore(R) ⊆ Core(R) ⊆ F(R).
Proof. Clearly the set F(R) is a closed and bounded, hence compact, subset of
RN. Moreover, Denault (2001) showed that coherence of the risk measure implies
that Core(R) is non-empty. Because FCore(R) ⊆ Core(R), it suﬃces to show that
Core(R) ⊆ F(R). This was shown in Boonen (2009). We provide an alternative proof.
First, y ∈ Core(R) implies that
yi ≤ ρ(Xi), for all i ∈ N,
yN = ρ(XN).
Thus, it suﬃces to show that yi ≥ minω∈Ω Xi(ω) for all i ∈ N. Let i ∈ N. First,
y ∈ Core(R) implies that
yN\{i} ≤ ρ(XN\{i}).
Moreover, Monotonicity of the coherent risk measure implies that
ρ(XN) = ρ(XN\{i} + Xi) ≥ ρ(XN\{i} + [min
ω∈Ω
Xi(ω)]   1).
Therefore,
yi = yN − yN\{i} = ρ(XN) − yN\{i} ≥ ρ(XN) − ρ(XN\{i})
≥ ρ(XN\{i} + [min
ω∈Ω
Xi(ω)]   1) − ρ(XN\{i})






11Hence, y ∈ F(R).
As argued above, our goal is to determine feasible capital allocations for which the
expected excess losses of sets of portfolios are minimized in lexicographical sense. To do
so, we deﬁne the excess of (a set of) portfolios as the expectation of the loss of this set
of portfolios in excess of the risk capital allocated to them. Later on, these excesses will
be used to evaluate the fairness of the risk capital allocation; if a set of portfolios has
a higher excess than another set of portfolios, this set of portfolios has been allocated
relatively little risk capital.
Deﬁnition 2.7 For any risk capital allocation a ∈ RN for a risk capital allocation







Note that for the special case where S consists of a single portfolio, the excess deﬁned
above is equal to the expected risk residual considered in Laeven and Goovaerts (2004),
Goovaerts, Van den Borre, and Laeven (2005), and Dhaene et al. (2009). In the following
example, we show that allocating risk capital on the basis of the Aumann-Shapley rule
may lead to large diﬀerences in the excesses of sets of portfolios with respect to the
amount of risk capital allocated to them.
Example 2.8 Consider again the risk capital problem R = (X,π,ρ) from Example 2.2
with γ = −15. Recall that the Aumann-Shapley value is given by a = (40,24). The excess
of a set of portfolios S with respect to the capital allocated to it, aS, can be depicted as
the area under the graph of the decumulative distribution function of the aggregate loss,
from the allocation point onwards, i.e., e(S,a,R) =
  ∞
aS P(XS ≥ x)dx. The graphs for
portfolio 1 and 2 (i.e., for S = {1}, and S = {2}) are displayed in Figure 1 and Figure
2, respectively.
The fact that portfolio 2 is allocated less risk capital even though it is strictly more risky













= (60 − 24)  
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(X1 + X2 − a1 − a2)
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In the remainder of this section, we introduce a risk capital allocation rule that aims
at minimizing the excesses in lexicographical sense. For any given capital allocation
problem R ∈ R, and any given allocation a ∈ F(R), we denote
e(a,R) = (e(S,a,R))S⊆N ∈ R2N
,
12x





Figure 1: Decumulative distribution function and excess of portfolio 1.
x
P(X2 ≥ x) a2 = 24




Figure 2: Decumulative distribution function and excess of portfolio 2.
for the vector that contains the excesses of all subsets of portfolios S ⊆ N with respect
to the allocation a. Our aim is to select feasible risk capital allocations a for which
the excesses that arise are lexicographically smaller than those of any other feasible risk
capital allocation. For completeness, we recall the deﬁnition of lexicographic ordering
(see, e.g., Fishburn, 1974)
Deﬁnition 2.9 For k ∈ N, and any two vectors x,y ∈ Rk, x is lexicographically strictly
smaller than y, denoted as x <lex y, if there exists an i ≤ k such that xi < yi, and for
all j < i it holds that xj = yj. Moreover, x is lexicographically smaller than y, denoted
by x ≤lex y, if x = y or x <lex y.
To determine the feasible allocation that minimizes the excesses in lexicographical sense,
we ﬁrst select from the set of feasible allocations those allocations for which the high-
est excess is minimized. Within the set of allocations for which the highest excess is
13minimized, we then determine those allocations for which the second highest excess is
minimized, and so on.5
To formalize this idea, for any x ∈ R2N
we let θ[x] ∈ R2N
be the vector that arises from
x by arranging the coordinates of x in a non-increasing fashion. Formally, we deﬁne
θ : R2N
→ R2N
by θi(x) = xσ(i) for all i, where σ is a permutation of {1,...,2N}, such
that xσ(1) ≥ xσ(2) ≥ ... ≥ xσ(2N). Now, the allocation rule we propose amounts to
ﬁnding the allocation that lexicographically minimizes the ordered excesses θ[e(a,R)].
Formally, we have the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 2.10 The Excess Based Allocation for a risk capital allocation problem R ∈
R is given by
EBA(R) = {a ∈ F(R)|θ[e(a,R)] ≤lex θ[e(y,R)],∀y ∈ F(R)}.
Now consider a capital allocation problem R. Then, any a ∈ EBA(R) yields “lower”
excesses than any other feasible allocation y in the sense that there exists an i such that
the i − 1 biggest excesses with respect to a are equal to the corresponding i − 1 biggest
excesses with respect to y, and the i-th biggest excesses with respect to a is strictly
smaller than the i-th biggest excesses with respect to y. For the remaining k−i smallest
excesses, no speciﬁc relation is required
Note that, by deﬁnition, eba is set-valued. We will show, however, that for any given
capital allocation problem R ∈ R, there is a unique allocation that yields the lexico-
graphical minimum of the excesses, i.e., EBA(R) contains only one allocation. To do
so, we ﬁrst show some basic properties of the excess functions e(S, ,R).
Lemma 2.11 Let R ∈ R. Then,
(i) for any two allocations a,b ∈ F(R) and any S ⊆ N it holds that
(a) if e(S,a,R) > e(S,b,R), then aS < bS,
(b) if e(S,a,R) = e(S,b,R) > 0, then aS = bS,
(c) e(N,a,R) = e(N,b,R).
(ii) for all a ∈ F(R) and i ∈ N it holds that e({i},a,R) = 0 implies ai = ρ(Xi).
(iii) for any S ⊆ N, it holds that e(S, ,R) is convex on F(R).
5This approach is similar to that in Schmeidler (1969), who introduces this method to ﬁnd the
nucleolus of a cooperative game. Because Schmeidler (1969) considers a diﬀerent setting (a cooperative
game), his deﬁnition of excess is diﬀerent from the one used in this paper.
14Proof. (a)(i) Let R ∈ R be given, and let a,b ∈ F(R) and S ⊆ N.








+   π(ω).
This implies that aS < bS.
(i)(b) Let a,b ∈ F(R) and S ⊆ N, such that e(S,a,R) = e(S,b,R) > 0. Then, there
exists an ω ∈ Ω such that XS(ω) − aS > 0. Therefore, bS > aS implies e(S,a,R) >
e(S,b,R), and bS < aS implies e(S,a,R) < e(S,b,R). This contradicts e(S,a,R) =
e(S,b,R), so we can conclude that aS = bS.
(i)(c) Follows immediately from the fact that a,b ∈ F(R) implies that aN = bN.






+   π(ω) = 0
implies that Xi(ω) ≤ ai for all ω ∈ Ω. Because ρ is a coherent risk measure, ρ(Xi) ≤
maxω∈Ω Xi(ω), which in turn implies ρ(Xi) ≤ ai. Therefore, we can conclude that
ρ(Xi) = ai.6
(iii) Let a ∈ F(R) and S ⊆ N. The results follows immediately from e(S,a,R) =  
ω∈Ω (XS(ω) − aS)
+ π(ω), and the fact that for any given constant c ∈ R, the function
f(x) = (c − x)
+ is convex.
We can now show that eba is a risk capital allocation rule on R, i.e., for every capital
allocation problem R ∈ R, there is a unique allocation that yields the lexicographic
minimum.
Theorem 2.12 For all R ∈ R, it holds that EBA(R) is single-valued.
Proof. First, we show that for all R ∈ R, it holds that EBA(R)  = ∅. Let R =
(X,π,ρ) ∈ R be a risk capital allocation problem. Let us denote
M1 = F(R)
Mi+1 = {a ∈ Mi |θi[e(a,R)] ≤ θi[e(y,R)],∀y ∈ Mi}, for i = 1,    ,2N.
Then, by construction, it follows that
EBA(R) = M2N+1.
6This inequality follows from Monotonicity of the coherent risk measure.
15It therefore suﬃces to show that M2N+1 is non empty. We show by induction that Mi
is compact and non-empty for all i = 1,    ,2N. For i = 1, it follows immediately from
Theorem 2.6 that M1 = F(R) is non-empty and compact. Now suppose Mi is compact
and non-empty for some i ∈
 
1,    ,2N 
. Because for all S ⊆ N, a  → e(S,a,R) is
continuous, θi[e(a,R)] is also continuous in a. Because Mi+1 = argmax{θi[e(a,R)] : a ∈
Mi} ⊂ Mi, this immediately implies that Mi+1 is compact and non-empty. Thus, by
induction, we conclude that M2N+1  = ∅.
Next, we show that for all a,b ∈ EBA(R) and all S ⊆ N, it holds that
e(S,a,R) = e(S,b,R).
Let a,b ∈ EBA(R) and let
M = {T ⊆ N : e(T,a,R)  = e(T,b,R)}.
Suppose that M  = ∅. We will show that that leads to a contradiction. Let S ∈ M be
such that
max{e(S,a,R),e(S,b,R)} ≥ max{e(T,a,R),e(T,b,R)}, for all T ∈ M. (8)
We assume, without loss of generality, that e(S,a,R) > e(S,b,R), and let
  a :=
1
2
(a + b) ∈ F(R).
We now show that θ[e(  a,R)] <lex θ[e(a,R)], which contradicts a ∈ EBA(R). Speciﬁ-
cally, we show that for those sets of portfolios T for which the excess with respect to
a is strictly larger than e(S,a,R), the excess with respect to   a is equal to the excess
with respect to a, for those sets of portfolios T for which the excess with respect to a is
equal to e(S,a,R), the excess with respect to   a is lower than the excess with respect to
a,with a strict inequality for T = S, and, ﬁnally, for those sets of portfolios T for which
the excess with respect to a is strictly lower than e(S,a,R), the excess with respect to
  a is also strictly lower than e(S,a,R). Formally, we distinguish the following two cases:
(i) T ⊆ N with e(T,a,R) > e(S,a,R): It follows from (8) that T / ∈ M, so e(T,a,R) =
e(T,b,R). It then follows from Lemma 2.11 that aT = bT =   aT. Therefore,
e(T,  a,R) = e(T,a,R) > e(S,a,R). (9)
(ii) T ⊆ N with e(T,a,R) ≤ e(S,a,R): It follows from (8) that e(T,b,R) ≤ e(S,a,R).
Because e(T, ,R) is convex, this implies that
e(T,  a,R) ≤
1
2
[e(T,a,R) + e(T,b,R)] ≤ e(S,a,R). (10)
The inequality is strict when e(T,a,R) < e(S,a,R). It is also strict when T = S
because e(S,b,R) < e(S,a,R). Thus, we have
e(T,  a,R) ≤ e(S,a,R), if e(T,a,R) = e(S,a,R),T  = S,
< e(S,a,R), if T = S,
< e(S,a,R), if e(T,a,R) < e(S,a,R).
(11)
16Now let k = #{T : e(T,a,R) > e(S,a,R)}. It follows from (9) and (10) that the k
largest excesses under   a coincide with the k largest excesses under a, i.e., θi[e(  a,R)] =
θi[e(a,R)] for all i ≤ k. Next, let l = #{T : e(T,a,R) = e(S,a,R)}, i.e., the next l
largest excesses under a are all equal to e(S,a,R). It follows from (11) that θi[e(  a,R)] ≤
e(S,a,R) = θi[e(a,R)] for all i ∈ [k + 1,k + l]. Moreover, there is at least one strict
inequality because #{T : e(T,  a,R) = e(S,a,R)} ≤ l − 1 < l. Thus, we conclude
that θ[e(  a,R)] <lex θ[e(a,R)], which contradicts a ∈ EBA(R). Therefore, we have
e(S,a,R) = e(S,b,R) for all S ⊆ N.
Now we can show that the set EBA(R) contains only one element. Let R ∈ R. Let
a,b ∈ EBA(R). Then for all S ⊆ N it must hold that e(S,a,R) = e(S,b,R). In
particular this holds for all individual portfolios. Let i ∈ N. In order to show that
ai = bi, we can distinguish two cases. If e({i},a,R) = e({i},b,R) > 0, then according
to ii) in Lemma 2.11 we have ai = bi. If e({i},a,R) = e({i},b,R) = 0, then according
to b) in Lemma 2.11 we have ai = bi = ρ(Xi). So, we have a = b.
From now on, with slight abuse of notation, we denote the unique element of the singleton
set EBA(R) by EBA(R) as well.
As argued before, the allocation rule that we propose is inspired by the fact that allocat-
ing risk capital based on the Aumann-Shapley value can yield undesirable results in the
sense that some portfolios have relatively large expected excess losses. eba mitigates
that problem by determining the allocation for which the largest excess is as small as
possible. In addition, it has in common with other existing optimization approaches
(e.g., Dhaene, Goovaerts, and Kaas 2003, Laeven and Goovaerts 2004, Goovaerts, Van
den Borre, and Laeven 2005, and Dhaene, Tsanakas, Valdez, and Vanduﬀel 2009) that,
in contrast to the Aumann-Shapley value, it does not require diﬀerentiability of the risk
measure. It is therefore well-deﬁned on a broader class of capital allocation problems.
In the next section, we show that eba satisﬁes some additional desirable properties
3 Properties of EBA
In this section we deﬁne some desirable properties of allocation rules, and show that
eba satisﬁes these properties.
Let A : R → RN be a risk capital allocation rule. We consider the following properties:
(i) No Diversiﬁcation: for all R ∈ R it holds that if
 n
i=1 ρ(Xi) = ρ(XN), then
Ai(R) = ρ(Xi), for all i ∈ N.
(ii) Riskless Portfolio: for all R ∈ R and for all i ∈ N it holds that if Xi = c   1, then
Ai(R) = c.
17(iii) Symmetry: for all R ∈ R and for all i,j ∈ N such that Xi = Xj, it holds that
Ai(R) = Aj(R).
(iv) Translation Invariance: for all R ∈ R and for all i ∈ N it holds that if   R =
(   X,π,ρ), where   X = (X1,...,Xi + c   1,...,Xn), then
A(  R) = A(R) + c   ei,
where ei is the unit vector for portfolio i.
(v) Scale Invariance: for all R ∈ R it holds that if   R = (   X,π,ρ), where   X = (c  
X1,...,c   Xn) for some c ∈ R+, then
A(  R) = c   A(R).
No Diversiﬁcation means that if there are no gains for the portfolios in terms of total
risk capital required whether they are treated separately or as one entity, then allocation
of risk capital is trivial, that is, every portfolio gets allocated exactly what the risk
measure yields for that portfolio in isolation. If the Riskless Portfolio property holds,
then a portfolio with riskless payoﬀs (i.e., with a deterministic loss) gets allocated as
risk capital the loss it will incur for sure. The Symmetry property ensures that the
allocation depends only on the distribution of the losses of the portfolio. Translation
Invariance ensures that if in all states of the world an equal amount of losses is added
or subtracted to the losses of a portfolio, then that portfolio is allocated an additional
risk capital equal to this amount. Finally, Scale Invariance ensures, for example, that
the allocation of risk capital does not change when another currency is used.
We ﬁrst show that any feasible risk capital allocation rule, and thus eba in particular,
satisﬁes the No Diversiﬁcation property and the Riskless Portfolio property.
Theorem 3.1 Any feasible risk capital allocation rule A on R′ ⊆ R satisﬁes No Diver-
siﬁcation and the Riskless Portfolio property.
Proof. Let A be a feasible risk capital allocation rule. First, we prove the No Diver-
siﬁcation property. Let R = (X,π,ρ) ∈ R be such that
 n
i=1 ρ(Xi) = ρ(XN). Then,
it follows from (6) that F(R) = {a ∈ RN|ai = ρ(Xi), for all i ∈ N}. Because A is a
feasible risk capital allocation rule, this implies that Ai(R) = ρ(Xi) for all i ∈ N.
Next, we prove the Riskless Portfolio property. Let R = (X,π,ρ) ∈ R be such that
Xi = c   1 for some c ∈ R and i ∈ N . Since ρ is a coherent risk measure, it holds that
c = min
ω∈Ω
Xi(ω) ≤ Ai(R) ≤ ρ(Xi) ≤ max
ω∈Ω
Xi(ω) = c,
so Ai(R) = c.
The next theorem shows that eba also satisﬁes the Symmetry, Translation Invariance
and Scale Invariance properties.
18Theorem 3.2 eba satisﬁes Symmetry, Translation Invariance and Scale Invariance.
Proof. Let R = (X,π,ρ) ∈ R be given.
We start by proving the Symmetry property. Let Xi = Xj for some i,j ∈ N. Let
a = EBA(R), and deﬁne b ∈ RN by bk = ak for all k ∈ N\{i,j}, bi = aj and bj = ai. It
follows immediately from (2.7) that
e(S,a,R) = e(S,b,R) if i,j / ∈ S or if i,j ∈ S,
e(S,a,R) = e(S ∪ {j}\{i},b,R) if i ∈ S,j / ∈ S,
e(S,a,R) = e(S ∪ {i}\{j},b,R) if j ∈ S,i / ∈ S.
Hence, for every S ⊂ N, there exists a T ⊂ N so that e(S,a,R) = e(T,b,R), i.e., it holds
that θ[e(a,R)] = θ[e(b,R)]. Because EBA(R) is unique (Theorem 2.12), this implies
a = b, and we can conclude that aj = bi = ai.
Next, we prove the Translation Invariance property. Let i ∈ N and c ∈ R. Deﬁne a
second risk capital problem   R = (   X,π,ρ) ∈ R, where   X = (   X1,...,   Xn) = (X1,...,Xi+
c   1,...,Xn). First, note that minω∈Ω{   Xj(ω)} = minω∈Ω{Xj(ω)} + c   1(j=i). Second,
note that coherence of the risk measure ρ implies that ρ(   XN) = ρ(XN)+c and ρ(   Xj) =
ρ(Xj) + c   1(j=i). Therefore, we know that
F(  R) = {a + c   ei|a ∈ F(R)}.
Now let a ∈ F(R) and   a = a + c   ei. We now show that e(S,a,R) = e(S,  a,   R) for
all S ⊆ N. To do so, we distinguish two cases. For all S ⊆ N,S  ∋ i, it is clear that
e(S,a,R) = e(S,  a,   R). For all S ⊆ N,S ∋ i we have
e(S,  a,   R) = E
  
  XS −   aS
 + 
= E
   
  XS − c   1
 







So, θ[e(  a,   R)] = θ[e(a,R)]. Therefore, it follows that










θ[e(a + c   ei,   R)] : a ∈ F(R)
 
+ c   ei
= argmin
a lex {θ[e(a,R)] : a ∈ F(R)} + c   ei
= EBA(R) + c   ei
Finally, we prove the Scale Invariance property. Let c > 0. We deﬁne a second risk
capital problem   R = (   X,π,ρ) ∈ R, where   X = c   X. Coherence of the risk measure
19ρ implies that ρ(   XN) = c   ρ(XN) and ρ(   Xj) = c   ρ(Xj) for all j ∈ N. Moreover
minω∈Ω{   Xj(ω)} = c minω∈Ω{Xj(ω)}. Therefore, it follows that F(  R) = {c a|a ∈ F(R)}.
Moreover, it is veriﬁed easily that c   e(S,a,R) = e(S,c   a,   R) for every a ∈ F(R). This
implies that




θ[e(  a,   R)] :   a ∈ F(  R)
 




θ[e(c   a,   R)] : a ∈ F(R)
 
= c   argmin
a
lex {θ[c   e(a,R)] : a ∈ F(R)}
= c   EBA(R)
Therefore, we can conclude that eba satisﬁes the Scale Invariance property.
We know from Theorem 2.6 that the Aumann-Shapley value, when it exists, yields
a feasible allocation. Therefore, it follows from Theorem 3.1 that it satisﬁes the No
Diversiﬁcation property and the Riskless Portfolio property. Moreover, it follows from
Denault (2001) that it also satisﬁes the Translation Invariance and Scale Invariance
properties (this follows from the Aggregation Invariance property of Denault (2001)).
Thus, eba and the Aumann-Shapley both satisfy the set of properties deﬁned above.
Another desirable property of a risk capital allocation rule, however, is that “small”
changes in the probability distributions of the losses should not cause a major change in
the allocation of risk capital. Formally, we introduce the following deﬁnition of continuity
on the class of risk capital allocation problems.
Deﬁnition 3.3 A capital allocation rule A : R → RN is continuous on R if for every
sequence
 
(Xk,π,ρ) : k ∈ N
 
⊂ R that satisﬁes
(i) limk→∞ Xk
i (ω) = Xi(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω and for all i ∈ N,
(ii) limk→∞ ρ(Xk







Because one cannot expect a feasible risk capital allocation rule to be continuous if
small changes in the probability distributions of the losses can induce large changes in
the feasible set, we add conditions (ii) and (iii). Condition (ii) ensures that the aggregate
risk capital, ρ(XN), converges. Condition (iii) guarantees that the upper bounds of the
feasible set (i.e., ρ(Xi) for all i ∈ N) converge. Convergence of the lower bounds (i.e.,
min{Xi : ω ∈ Ω} for all i ∈ N) is guaranteed by (i). Clearly, when the risk measure ρ( )
is continuous in the sense that (i) implies (ii), then (ii) and (iii) follow from (i).
20Recall that Example 2.2 shows that for some risk capital allocation problems, the
Aumann-Shapley value does not exist. The following example shows that in the case
considered in that example, there does not exist a continuous extension of the Aumann-
Shapley value to the set of all risk capital allocation problems.
Example 3.4 Consider again Example 2.2. It is veriﬁed easily that the aggregate risk
capital, ρ(XN), as well as the amounts of risk capital for each portfolio separately, ρ(X1)
and ρ(X2), are continuous in γ. Recall that the Aumann-Shapley value does not exist
for γ ∈ {30,36}. Moreover, it jumps from (40,24) to (50,14) when γ increases from just
below 30 to just above 30. Therefore, there does not exist a continuous extension of the
Aumann-Shapley value to the set of all risk capital allocation problems. In contrast, it
can be veriﬁed that:
EBA(R) = (32,32) if γ 6 30
= (27 + γ/6,27 + γ/6) if 30 < γ 6 32.4
= (45 − 7γ/18,9 + 13γ/18) if 32.4 < γ 6 36
= (25 + γ/6,5 + 5γ/6) if 36 < γ 6 66
= (36,γ − 6) if γ > 66.
It is veriﬁed easily that EBA(R) is continuous in γ.
In the above example, we see that EBA(R) is continuous in γ. The following theorem
shows that, more generally, eba is a continuous allocation rule on the set of all risk
capital allocation problems.
Theorem 3.5 eba satisﬁes Continuity on R.
The proof can be found in Appendix A. It is partly inspired by Kohlberg (1971), who
proves continuity for the nucleolus of a cooperative game.
4 Linear programming approach
In this section we show how for a given allocation problem R, EBA(R) can be found
by solving a sequence of linear programming problems. Throughout this section, we let
R be given, and denote EBA(R) by EBA.
The approach we propose is inspired by an approach to determine the nucleolus of a
cooperative game (see, e.g., Kohlberg 1971). However, there are important diﬀerences.
First, for the nucleolus, the ”value” of a coalition (in our case a set of portfolios) is a
real number; in our case it is a random variable. Second, whereas the objective in case
of the nucleolus is the diﬀerence between the coalition value and the allocated number,
the objective in our case is the expected loss in excess of the allocated risk capital,
i.e., negative diﬀerences are cut oﬀ at zero. Third, the feasible set in our case consists
of eﬃcient allocations that are coordinatewise bounded both above and below. The
nucleolus considers eﬃcient allocations that are coordinatewise bounded below only.7
7In a cost game, the nucleolus considers eﬃcient allocations that are coordinatewise bounded above
only.
21The sequence of linear programming problems we propose determines the sets b1,    ,bp
and corresponding values of the excesses e1,...,ep in an inductive manner.
Deﬁnition 4.1 For any R ∈ R and for all a ∈ F(R) the coalition array b01,b02,b1,...,bp
belonging to (R,a) is deﬁned as

    
    
b01 = {i|ai = minω∈Ω Xi(ω)},
b02 = {i|ai = ρ(Xi)},
b1 = {S ⊆ N|e(S,a,R) = maxT⊆N{e(T,a,R)|T ⊆ N}},
bj = {S ⊆ N|e(S,a,R) = maxT⊆N{e(T,a,R)|T ⊆ N,T / ∈ b1 ∪ ... ∪ bj−1}},
for every j ∈ N, j ≥ 2, such that b1 ∪     ∪ bj−1  = 2N. The number p ∈ N is such that
b1 ∪     ∪ bp = 2N and for all 1 ≤ k ≤ p it holds bk  = ∅.
For every j ∈ N, the set bj consists of those sets of portfolios S for which the excess loss
with respect to the allocated risk capital is the j-th largest among all the excesses, and
ej is the corresponding value of the excess. Furthermore, b01 contains all portfolios that
are allocated their minimal loss (i.e., for which the lower bound in the feasible set is
binding), and b02 all portfolios that are allocated the risk capital of their own portfolio
(i.e., for which the upper bound in the feasible set is binding). This is illustrated in the
following example.
























and ρ(Y ) = ρES
0.10(Y ). Then, since ρ(Xi) = 1 and minω∈Ω Xi(ω) = 0 for all i ∈ N, and
ρ(XN) = 2, it holds that
F(R) = {a ∈ [0,1]N|a1 + a2 + a3 = 2}.
Consider the allocation a = (1
2, 3
4, 3






and corresponding values of the excesses are e1 = 1
4, e2 = 1
8 and e3 = 0.
We will denote b01,b02,b1,    ,bp for the coalition array that belongs to (R,EBA),
and e1,...,ep for the corresponding excesses. Thus, for all j ≤ p,
22• bj ⊂ 2N consists of those sets of portfolios S for which the excess loss with respect
to EBA is the j-th largest among all the excesses;
• ej ∈ R denotes the value of the excess of each set of portfolios S ∈ bj with respect





Note that, by construction, p is such that
b1∪    ∪ bk   2N, for all k < p,
b1∪    ∪ bp = 2N.
The sequence of linear programming problems we propose determines the sets b1,    ,bp
and corresponding values of the excesses e1,...,ep in an inductive manner.
First, for any given b1,    ,bk−1 ⊆ 2N, and e1,    ,ek−1 ∈ R, we deﬁne the linear
optimization problem Pk(b1,    ,bk−1,e1,    ,ek−1) as follows
minvk
ak




Xi(ω), for all i ∈ N, (13)
ak
N = ρ(XN), (14)
 
ω∈Ω
π(w)   λk(S,ω) = ej, for all S ∈ bj, j < k, (15)
 
ω∈Ω
π(w)   λk(S,ω) ≤ vk, for all S ∈ 2N\(b1 ∪ ... ∪ bk−1), (16)
λk(S,ω) ≥ XS(ω) − ak
S, for all S ∈ 2N, ω ∈ Ω, (17)
λk(S,ω) ≥ 0, for all S ∈ 2N, ω ∈ Ω, (18)
We denote a feasible solution to the linear program by the tuple (ak,vk,λk) ∈ RN ×R×
Rm×2N
.
The following lemma shows that solving Pk(b1,    ,bk−1,e1,    ,ek−1) either immedi-
ately yields EBA, or it yields the k-th largest excess with respect to EBA, as well as a
superset of the corresponding element of the coalition array. Speciﬁcally, for any given
optimal solution (ak,vk,λk) to Pk(b1,   ,bk−1,e1,   ,ek−1), we denote
bk = {S ∈ 2N|e(S,ak,R) = vk}, (19)
b
k





02 = {i ∈ N|ak
i = ρ(Xi)}.
Then, we have the following result.
Lemma 4.3 Let k ≤ p. There exists an optimal solution to Pk(b1,   ,bk−1,e1,   ,ek−1).
Moreover, for any optimal solution (ak,vk,λk), it holds that vk = ek, and
23(i) if vk = 0, then ak = EBA;
(ii) if vk > 0, then:
(a) ak
S = EBAS for all S ∈ b1∪    ∪ bk;
(b) bk ⊇ bk.
The proof can be found in Appendix B.
The above lemma shows that solving Pk(b1,    ,bk−1,e1,    ,ek−1) yields ek, the k-
th largest excess with respect to EBA. Moreover, if vk = 0, then EBA is found.
If vk > 0, then the solution yields a superset bk of the coalition array bk corre-
sponding to the k-th largest excess with respect to EBA. In order to be able to
solve Pk(b1,   ,bk,e1,   ,ek), we need to reduce the superset bk to bk, i.e., we need
to identify those elements of bk that are also elements of bk. To do so, for any
given b1,    ,bk−1,d ⊆ 2N, and b01,b02 ⊆ 2N, we deﬁne the optimization problem
Qk(b01,b02,b1,    ,bk−1,d), with decision variables yi for all i ∈ N, as follows




yi ≤ 1, for all i ∈ N,
yi ≥ 0, for all i ∈ b01,
yi ≤ 0, for all i ∈ b02,
yS ≥ 0, for all S ∈ (b1 ∪ ... ∪ bk−1) ∪ d,
yN = 0.




02,b1,    ,bk−1,d) while
appropriately updating the set d yields d = bk.
Lemma 4.4 Let k ≤ p, and let (ak,vk,λk) be an optimal solution to Pk(b1,   ,bk−1,e1,   ,ek−1).
If vk > 0, then for any d ⊆ 2N such that bk ⊆ d ⊆ bk,




02,b1,    ,bk−1,d);




02,b1,    ,bk−1,d), it holds that:
(a) bk ⊆ {S ∈ d|yS = 0};





02,b1,   ,bk−1,d) = 0.
The proof can be found in Appendix B.
The above lemma implies that, starting from d = bk, one can can indeed reﬁne the set










02,b1,   ,bk−1,d) > 0, then there
exist sets of portfolios S ∈ d for which yS > 0, and it follows from (i)(a) that these sets










02,b1,   ,bk−1,d) = 0. It then follows from
(ii)(b) that d = bk.
Combining the above two lemmas yields the following result.
Theorem 4.5 Let R ∈ R be given, and consider the following algorithm:
1. Set k = 1.
2. Obtain an optimal solution (ak,vk,λk) to Pk(b1,    ,bk−1,v1,    ,vk−1).
3. If vk > 0, go to Step 4, else stop.















02,b1,   ,bk−1,bk) > 0, set bk = {S ∈ bk|yS = 0} and return to Step 5. Else,
go to Step 7.
7. If b1 ∪     ∪ bk  = 2N, set k = k + 1, and return to Step 2, else stop.
The algorithm terminates after p iterations, and yields ap = EBA.
Proof. First, we show that for all k < p, it holds that after the k-the iteration,
 
b1,    ,bk,v1,    ,vk
 
= (b1,    ,bk,e1,    ,ek). (20)
Let k = 1. Lemma 4.3 implies that v1 = e1, and because excesses are nonnegative
and p > 1, we know that v1 > 0. Therefore, Lemma 4.4 implies that repeating Step 5





02,b1) = 0 yields b1 = b1. Next, suppose (20) holds true for
some k = j < p − 1. Then, Lemma 4.3 implies that vj+1 = ej+1, and j + 1 < p
implies that vj+1 > 0, and it follows from Lemma 4.4 that bj+1 = bj+1. Therefore, (20)
holds true for k = j + 1, and it follows by induction that
 
b1,    ,bp−1,v1,    ,vp−1
 
=  
b1,    ,bp−1,e1,    ,ep−1
 
.
Next, consider k = p. In a similar way, it can be shown that
vp = ep, (21)
if vp > 0, then bp = bp. (22)
Next, we show that the algorithm terminates after p iterations. The algorithm termi-
nates after the ﬁrst iteration for which either vk = 0 or b1 ∪     ∪ bk = 2N. Now (20),
25(21), (22), and the fact that by deﬁnition, b1 ∪   ∪bp = 2N, imply that k ≤ p. Now if
vk = 0, then vj > 0 for all j < k, and it follows from (20) and (21) that ej = vj > 0 for
all j < k, and ek = vk = 0. Because excesses are nonnegative, this implies that k = p.
If b1 ∪   ∪bk = 2N and vk > 0, then b1 ∪   ∪bj   2N for all j < k and it follows from
(20) and (22) that b1 ∪   ∪bj   2N for all j < k, and b1 ∪   ∪bk = 2N. This implies
that k = p.
Finally, we show that the algorithm yields ap = EBA. We know the algorithm termi-
nates after the p-th iteration. Then either vp = 0, or b1 ∪    ∪bp = b1 ∪     ∪ bp = 2N
and vp > 0. It then follows from Lemma 4.3(i) and (ii)(c), respectively, that ap = EBA.
5 Conclusions
This paper considers the allocation problem that arises when the total risk capital
withheld by a ﬁrm needs to be divided over several portfolios within the ﬁrm. We propose
an alternative allocation rule that amounts to determining the unique allocation that
lexicographically minimizes the expected losses of all sets of portfolios in excess of the
risk capital allocated to them. The approach is inspired by the fact that an allocation
rule that has received considerable attention in the literature, the Aumann-Shapley
value, can yield undesirable results in the sense that some portfolios have large expected
excess losses. The alternative allocation rule that we propose mitigates that problem
by determining the allocation for which the largest excess is as small as possible. As
compared to the Aumann-Shapley value, it has some additional advantages in common
with existing optimization approaches, e.g., it does not require diﬀerentiability of the
risk measure, and it satisﬁes continuity. Finally, we show that the allocation that we
propose can be determined by solving a series of linear programming problems.
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29A Proof of Theorem 3.5
Before we give the actual proof of the continuity of eba, we ﬁrst introduce several
notions.
Deﬁnition A.1 A coalition array b01,b02,b1,    ,bp satisﬁes the No Improvement Prop-
erty8 if for all k = 1,2,...,p, it holds that if y ∈ RN satisﬁes
yi ≥ 0, for all i ∈ b01, (23)
yi ≤ 0, for all i ∈ b02, (24)
yN = 0, (25)
yS ≥ 0, for all S ∈ b1 ∪     ∪ bk, (26)
then it satisﬁes
yS = 0,for all S ∈ b1 ∪     ∪ bk. (27)
This property means for an allowed risk capital allocation that there is no lexicographic
improvement of the allocation possible, without either being outside the set F(R), or
worsening the excess of a set of portfolios that already has a high excess.
Lemma A.2 Let R ∈ R, a ∈ F(R) and b01,b02,b1,    ,bp is the coalition array belong-
ing to (R,a). Suppose that the implication in the No Improvement Property holds for
k = 1,    ,p − 1 and all y ∈ RN, and that e(S,a,R) = 0 for all S ∈ bp. Then the
implication also holds for k = p and all y ∈ RN.
Proof. Note that b1∪...∪bp contains all sets of portfolios, so in particular all individual
portfolios. Let y ∈ RN satisfy conditions (23)-(26) for k = p and let i ∈ N. If {i} ∈
b1∪   ∪bp−1, we have yi = 0 since equation (27) holds for k = p−1. If {i} ∈ bp, we have
that e({i},a,R) = 0. From Lemma 2.11 it follows that ai = ρ(Xi), so i ∈ b02. However,
since equations (24) and (26) for k = p imply that yi ≤ 0 and yi ≥ 0 respectively, we
get that yi = 0. Because y is additive and yi = 0 for all i ∈ N, we ﬁnd that yS = 0 for
all S ⊆ N.
Lemma A.3 Let R ∈ R. Then the coalition array belonging to (R,EBA(R)) satisﬁes
the No Improvement Property.
Proof. Let EBA = EBA(R) and b01,b02,b1,    ,bp the coalition array belonging to
(R,EBA). Assume there exists a y ∈ RN and a k ∈ {1,    ,p} such that conditions
(23)-(26) are satisﬁed, but for at least one T ∈ b1 ∪     ∪ bk it holds yT > 0. Let k∗
be the smallest number with this property. Because of this choice of k∗, yS = 0 for all
S ∈ b1 ∪     ∪ bk∗−1, so T ∈ bk∗. Then for i ∈ b01 we have that EBAi = minω∈Ω Xi(ω)
and yi ≥ 0, so EBAi + t   yi ≥ minω∈Ω Xi(ω) for positive t. For i ∈ b02 we have
8The property is called Property I in Kohlberg (1971).
30that EBAi = ρ(Xi) and yi ≤ 0, so EBAi + t   yi ≤ ρ(Xi). Furthermore, yN = 0,
so EBAN + t   yN = EBAN = ρ(XN). Because for all i / ∈ b01 ∪ b02 it holds that
minω∈Ω Xi(ω) < EBAi < ρ(Xi), it follows that EBA + t   y ∈ F(R) for t small enough.
For all sets of portfolios S ∈ b1 ∪     ∪ bk∗ we have that
e(S,EBA + t   y,R) = E
 











so no set of portfolios in b1 ∪     ∪ bk∗ has a higher excess. We can now distinguish two
cases.
(i) e(T,EBA,R) > 0. Then
e(T,EBA + t   y,R) = E
 







so T has a lower excess, and thus EBA+t y is lexicographically better than EBA,
which is a contradiction.
(ii) e(T,EBA,R) = 0. Then we have k∗ = p since all excesses are at least zero, hence
e(S,EBA,R) = 0 for all S ∈ bp. So for k = 1,    ,p − 1 the implications of the
No Improvement Property hold. But then Lemma A.2 states the implication for
k = p also holds, and thus the No Improvement Property is satisﬁed.
Lemma A.4 If the coalition array that belongs to (R,a) for some R ∈ R and a ∈ F(R)
possesses the No Improvement Property, then a = EBA(R).
Proof. Let R ∈ R, a ∈ F(R). Let EBA = EBA(R). Then EBA is as least as
good, lexicographically, as a. Let b01,b02,b1,    ,bp denote the coalition array of (R,a).
Obviously we have EBAN = ρ(XN) = aN, thus
(EBA − a)N = 0.
For all i ∈ b01 we have that ai = minω∈Ω Xi(ω) and EBAi ≥ minω∈Ω Xi(ω), so
(EBA − a)i ≥ 0.
Also, since for all i ∈ b02 we have that ai = ρ(Xi) and EBAi ≤ ρ(Xi), we have
(EBA − a)i ≤ 0.
So the inequalities (23), (24) and (25) are satisﬁed for (EBA − a) ∈ RN.
Using induction, we show that EBAS = aS for all S ⊂ N. Take k = 1. For all S ∈ b1 we
have that e(S,a,R) ≥ e(S,EBA,R) because these are by deﬁnition the highest excesses.
31If e(S,a,R) = 0 for all S ∈ b1, then e(T,a,R) = e(T,EBA,R) = 0 for all T ⊂ N and
hence a = EBA. If e(S,a,R) > 0 for all S ∈ b1, we use Lemma 2.11 to ﬁnd
(EBA − a)S ≥ 0.
According to the No Improvement Property, this implies for all S ∈ b1 that
(EBA − a)S = 0.
Now let 1 ≤ k < p. Assume for all T ∈ b1 ∪ ... ∪ bk it holds that (EBA − a)T = 0.
Then we have for all S ∈ bk+1 that e(S,a,R) ≥ e(S,EBA,R). If e(S,a,R) = 0, then
k + 1 = p and hence e(S,EBA,R) = 0. So, e(S,a,R) = e(S,EBA,R) for all S and
hence a = EBA. Otherwise, we have that e(S,a,R) > 0. Then Lemma 2.11 implies
(EBA − a)S ≥ 0,
which in turn implies that
(EBA − a)S = 0.
So, for all S ⊆ N we ﬁnd (EBA − a)S = 0, and thus a = EBA = EBA(R).
We can now show that eba satisﬁes Continuity.
Theorem 3.5 eba satisﬁes Continuity on R.
Proof. Consider the sequence of risk capital allocation problems R1,R2,... where Rk =
(Xk,π,ρ) ∈ R for all k ∈ N, that converges to R = (X,π,ρ) ∈ R. Let ak = EBA(Rk)
for all k ∈ N and a = EBA(R). We have to show that limk→∞ ak = a.
Let i ∈ N. Choose Li = infk∈N{minω∈Ω Xk
i (ω)} and Ui = supk∈N{ρ(Xk
i )}. Because
the deﬁnition of convergence of risk capital allocation problems includes convergence of
Xk
i and ρ(Xk
i ), this inﬁmum and supremum exist. Deﬁne the compact set H = {y ∈
RN|Li ≤ yi ≤ Ui, for all i ∈ N}. Clearly F(Rk) ⊆ H for all k ∈ N. Since H is compact,
it suﬃces to show that every converging subsequence ak1,ak2,... converges to a.
Let ak1,ak2,... be a subsequence converging to g. Assume without loss of generality
that the coalition array belonging to each (Rk,ak)) is b01,b02,b1,    ,bp.9 According
to Lemma A.3, for every element of ak1,ak2,... the No Improvement Property holds.




















9This assumption can be made because the number of sets of portfolios is ﬁnite. Thus there are
ﬁnitely many possibilities for the coalition array of any (R
k,a
k). Since the sequence a
k1,a
k2,... is
inﬁnitely long, there exists a subsequence that has the same coalition array b01,b02,b1,...,bp for all
elements of that sequence, and this subsequence also converges to g. Therefore, any results about the
convergence of that subsequence can be extended to a
k1,a
k2,....
32so because E[ ] is a continuous function, we have that e(S,g,R) = e(T,g,R) in the
limit. Hence in the coalition array of g we have that all sets of portfolios of bi are still
in the same set, formally bi ⊆ cj for some j ∈ {1,    ,q}. So we have that c1,    ,cq is
a coarsening of b1,    ,bp. Similarly, for S ∈ bi and T ∈ bj with i < j we have
e(S,aki,Rki) > e(T,aki,Rki),
so in the limit we have
e(S,g,R) ≥ e(T,g,R),
meaning this coalition array c1,    ,cq does not change the order with respect to the
sets of portfolios as given by b1,    ,bp. Because the implication of the No Improvement
Property is weaker for c01,c02,c1,...,cq than for b01,b02,b1,    ,bp, the No Improvement
Property also holds for the coalition array of g.
It remains to be shown that g ∈ F(R). For i ∈ b02 we have that ak
i = ρ(Xk
i ) for all k
and all i ∈ N, so we see that gi = ρ(Xi) since both sides of the equality converge. Thus
i ∈ c02, so b02 ⊆ c02. For i ∈ b01 we have that ak
i = minω∈Ω Xk
i (ω), and this equality is
preserved if we take the limit, so i ∈ c01 and hence b01 ⊆ c01.
Because g ∈ F(R) and the No Improvement Property holds, g = EBA(R). Because a is
a single point according to Theorem 2.12, we ﬁnd that g = a and thus any converging
subsequence converges to a.
B Proofs of Lemma 4.3 and Lemma 4.4
In order to prove Lemmas 4.3 and 4.4, we need an auxiliary lemma.
Lemma B.1 Let k ≤ p, and let (ak,vk,λk) be an optimal solution to Pk(b1,    ,bk−1,e1,    ,ek−1).
Then, we have:
(i) ak ∈ F(R),
(ii) e(S,ak,R) ≤
 
ω∈Ω π(ω)   λk(S,ω) for all S ⊆ N,
(iii) e(S,ak,R) = ej for all S ∈ bj, where j < k.
Proof. (i) It follows from (12)-(14) and Deﬁnition 2.4 that ak ∈ F(R).
(ii) Let S ⊆ N and ω ∈ Ω. Then from equations (17) and (18) it follows that λk(S,ω) ≥
max{0,XS(ω) − ak
S}. Thus, we ﬁnd that
 
ω∈Ω









33(iii) Deﬁne the vector y = ak − EBA ∈ RN. We will show that yS = 0 and thus
ak












N − EBAN = 0. (31)




π(ω)   λk(S,ω) = ej = e(S,EBA,R). (32)
Because k ≤ p implies that b1∪    ∪ bj ⊆ b1∪    ∪ bk−1  = 2N, it holds that ej > 0.
Therefore, it follows from Lemma 2.11 (a)(ii) that ak
S ≥ EBAS for all S ∈ b1∪    ∪ bk−1,
and thus
yS = ak
S − EBAS ≥ 0,for all S ∈ b1∪    ∪ bk−1.
Hence, it follows from Lemma A.3 (the No Improvement Property) that yS = 0, and
thus ak
S = EBAS, for all S ∈ b1∪... ∪ bk−1. Therefore, we conclude that
e(S,ak,R) = e(S,EBA,R) = ej,for all S ∈ bj, j < k.
Proof of Lemma 4.3. We ﬁrst show that for any k ≤ p, there exists an optimal
solution to Pk(b1,   ,bk−1,e1,   ,ek−1). First, k ≤ p implies b1∪    ∪ bk−1   2N,
and therefore it follows from (16) and (18) that any feasible (ak,vk,λk) satisﬁes vk ≥  
ω∈Ω π(ω)   λk(S,ω) ≥ 0. Thus, the objective value is bounded below. It therefore
remains to see that the feasible region is non-empty. It can be veriﬁed easily that
ak = EBA, vk = ek, and λk(S,ω) = (XS(ω) − EBAS)+, for all S ∈ 2N,and ω ∈ Ω is a
feasible solution.
(i) We know from Lemma B.1 (iii) that
e(S,ak,R) = ej = e(S,EBA,R), for all S ∈ bj,j < k. (33)
Because excesses are non-negative by deﬁnition, and because vk = 0, (16) and Lemma
B.1(ii) imply that
0 ≤ e(S,ak,R) ≤
 
ω∈Ω
π(ω)   λk(S,ω) ≤ vk = 0, for all S ∈ 2N\(b1∪    ∪ bk−1),
hence
e(S,ak,R) = 0 ≤ e(S,EBA,R), for all S ∈ 2N\(b1∪    ∪ bk−1). (34)
34Combining (33) and (34) yields that e(S,ak,S) ≤ e(S,EBA,R) for all S ⊆ N, and
therefore ak ∈ F(R) is lexicographically at least as good as EBA. Because EBA is the
unique lexicographical minimum over all risk capital allocations in F(R), this implies
that ak = EBA.
Finally, ak = EBA and (34) implies that
ek = e(S,EBA,R) = e(S,ak,R) = 0,for all S ∈ bk.
Because vk = 0, this yields vk = ek.
(ii)(a) Consider the vector y = ak − EBA ∈ RN. It follows from the proof of Lemma
B.1 that
yi ≥ 0, for all i ∈ b
k
01, (35)
yi ≤ 0, for all i ∈ b
k
02, (36)
yN = 0, (37)
and
yS = 0, for all S ∈ b1∪    ∪ bk−1. (38)
Moreover, because (EBA,ek,((XS(ω)−EBAS)+)S⊆N,ω∈Ω) is feasible for Pk(b1,    ,bk−1,e1,    ,ek−1),
we have
vk ≤ ek. (39)




π(ω)   λk(S,ω) ≤ vk ≤ ek = e(S,EBA,R), (40)
and Lemma 2.11 implies that ak
S ≥ EBAS. Therefore,
yS = ak
S − EBAS ≥ 0,for all S ∈ bk.
Then, it follows from Lemma A.3 (the No Improvement Property for EBA) implies that
yS = 0 for all S ∈ b1∪    ∪ bk.
(b) We show by contradiction that bk ⊆ bk. Suppose there exists an S ∈ bk such
that S / ∈ bk. Then it follows from (16), (19), and (39) that e(S,ak,R) < vk ≤ ek =
e(S,EBA,R), and Lemma 2.11 implies that EBAS < ak
S. This contradicts EBAS = ak
S.
Thus there does not exist an S ∈ bk such that S / ∈ bk, hence bk ⊆ bk.
Finally, we know from part (a) that EBAS = ak
S for all S ∈ bk. This implies that
e(S,ak,R) = e(S,EBA,R) = ek > 0, for all S ∈ bk.
Combined with (40), this yields vk = ek.
In order to prove Lemma 4.2, we need the following lemma.
35Lemma B.2 If z ∈ RN satisﬁes
zi ≥ 0, for all i ∈ b
k
01, (41)
zi ≤ 0, for all i ∈ b
k
02, (42)
zN = 0, (43)
zS ≥ 0, for all S ∈ b1∪... ∪ bk, (44)
then it satisﬁes
zS = 0,for all S ∈ b1∪... ∪ bk. (45)




02,b1,    ,bk the above implication
holds. Suppose there exists a vector z ∈ RN such that conditions (41)-(44) hold, but
the implication in equation (45) is violated. Let j be the smallest index such that there
is an S ∈ bj with zS > 0, and let T ∈ bj be a set of portfolios such that zT > 0. Observe
that, similar to the proof of Lemma A.3, we have that ak + t   z ∈ F(R), for t small
enough.
We show that the vector y = ak + t   z − EBA ∈ RN violates the No Improvement
Property for EBA. Because ak + t   z ∈ F(R), it holds that
yi = ak
i + t   zi − min
ω∈Ω








N + t   zN − EBAN = 0. (48)
Because by construction zS = 0 for all S ∈ b1∪    ∪ bj−1, it follows that yS = ak
S −
EBAS for all S ∈ b1∪    ∪ bj−1. Combined with Lemma 4.3(ii)(a), this yields
yS = 0,for all S ∈ b1∪    ∪ bj−1.
Moreover, (44) implies that for all S ∈ bj we have
yS = ak
S + t   zS − EBAS = t   zS ≥ 0.
and, because by construction zT,
yT = t   zT > 0.
This contradicts the fact that EBA satisﬁes the No Improvement Property.
Proof. We ﬁrst show that for any given b1,    ,bk−1,d ⊆ 2N, and b01,b02 ⊆ 2N,
there exists an optimal solution to Qk(b01,b02,b1,    ,bk−1,d). Because yi = 0 for
all i ∈ N is feasible, the value of the objective function is always at least zero, i.e.,
fQk(b01,b02,b1,   ,bk−1,d) ≥ 0. Thus the feasible region is non-empty, and since also yi ≤ 1
for all i ∈ N, the value of the objective function is bounded and thus this problem has
a solution.




02,b1,    ,bk−1,d) satisﬁes (41)-(44). Therefore, it




02,b1,    ,bk−1,d),
then yS = 0 for all S ∈ bk. Since this holds true for any feasible solution, it holds true
for the optimal solution y.






02,b1,   ,bk−1,d) = 0 implies bk = d. Suppose d  = bk. Let y = α (EBA−ak) ∈ RN,
with α > 0 such that
yi ≤ 1, for all i ∈ N.
First, Lemma 4.3 implies that
yS = α   (EBAS − ak
S) = 0, for all S ∈ b1∪    ∪ bk.
Moreover, EBA ∈ F(R) implies






≥ 0, for all i ∈ b
k
01, (49)
yi = α   [EBAi − ρ(Xi)] ≤ 0, for all i ∈ b
k
02, (50)






Next, suppose there exists a S ∈ d\bk. Then, because d ⊆ bk and because it follows
from Lemma 4.3 that vk = ek, so that bk ⊆ 2N\(b1 ∪     ∪ bk−1), it holds that S / ∈
b1 ∪     ∪ bk, so that
e(S,EBA,R) < ek. (52)
Moreover, we know from Lemma 4.3 that vk = ek. Then, S ∈ d ⊆ bk and (19) imply
that
e(S,ak,R) = vk = ek > 0. (53)
Combined with (52), this implies e(S,ak,R) > e(S,EBA,R), and thus ak
S < EBAS.
Hence
yS > 0,for all S ∈ d\bk.































02,b1,   ,bk−1,d) =
0. Thus bk = d.


















where the last equality follows from part (i).
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